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OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

The Transitional Period

(PERIOD)

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
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HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

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HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

CHAPTER I



THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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History of the Office of Communications
The Transitional Period

A. INTRODUCTION

This Chapter covers the years following termination of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), including operations under the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), and the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), and concludes with the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency. The official time span is 1 October 1945, to 18 September 1947. A history of OSS Communications already is written and is deposited in the CIA Records Center. For continuity purposes, references are made herein to the general status of OSS Communications at the conclusion of its recorded history. As the OSS history extends only to mid-1945, additional noteworthy references are included for the period between mid-1945 and 1 October 1945.

B. TERMINATION OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)

By Executive Order 9621 of 20 September 1945, effective 1 October 1945, President Harry S. Truman terminated the Office of Strategic Services and divided its functions between the Department of State and the Department of War. This Order reads in part as follows:

"There are transferred to and consolidated in an Interim Research and Intelligence Service, which is hereby established in the Department of State, (a) the functions of the Research and Analysis Branch and of the Presentation Branch of the Office of Strategic Services.... The Interim Research and Intelligence Service shall be abolished as of the close of business December 31, 1945, and the Secretary of State shall provide for winding up its affairs.

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"All functions of the Office not transferred (to the Department of State), together with all personnel, records, property, and funds of the Office not so transferred, are transferred to the Department of War; and the Office, including the Office of the Director of Strategic Services, is terminated.... The Secretary of War shall, whenever he deems it compatible with the national interest, discontinue any activity transferred by this paragraph and wind up all affairs relating thereto.

"This Order shall, except as otherwise specifically provided be effective as of the opening of business October 1, 1945."

C. OSS COMMUNICATIONS - THE FINAL MONTHS

1. General

The following quotations from the History of OSS Communications 1/reflect the general status of OSS Communications at the approximate time of its termination:

"As of July, 1945, the Communications Branch operations, as viewed in their world-wide extent, were decreasing in scope. The three major factors causing this were the cessation of hostilities in the European War, the budget cut which curtailed laboratory and development work, and the limit placed on the number of Communications men who could be sent to the Far East. Viewed by theater, METO (Middle East Theater) was practically closed, having only twelve Army personnel on duty; ETO (European Theater) was sending its personnel back rapidly, and was down to 315 Army officers and men; and China-India-Burma had almost reached the peak number allowed for the theaters, with fifty-four Army officers and 580 enlisted men. Twenty-one officers and 70 enlisted men were assigned within the U. S. Navy and civilian personnel in small numbers also were assigned to the various theaters and the U. S."

"Communications Branch, as the largest operational Branch of OSS, had passed its peak, but was still engaged in providing facilities for Far East operations to the best of its ability."

"On 15 June 1945, [REDACTED] USMCR, then Executive Officer, became Chief, Communications Branch, OSS. [REDACTED] continued in this assignment until the appointment of the first SSU Communications Chief. [REDACTED] (formerly of China-India-Burma theater) became Executive Officer on 20 June 1945."

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Regarding FEETO (Far East Theater):

"....through three years of organization and planning, which proceeded simultaneously with active operations, a highly efficient and intricate communications network was established which, in June 1945, outdistanced the facilities of all other theaters com-

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2. Liquidation

The liquidation of OSS activities started some time before the promulgation of the Executive Order relating to the termination of the Office of Strategic Services. This is reflected in a letter dated 20 September 1945, 2/ from President Truman to Major General William J. Donovan, Director of Strategic Services, which states in part:

"I appreciate very much the work which you and your Staff undertook, beginning prior to the Japanese surrender, to liquidate those wartime activities of the Office of Strategic Services which will not be needed in time of peace."

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It is noted, accordingly, that at the time of the actual termination order, steps already had been taken to close out or phase back OSS communications facilities and activities. This action was well under way in early 1945; and by 20 September 1945, they had crystallized to the extent explained in a letter from the Communications Division Chief,

[REDACTED]

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"Generally speaking, we are trying to make our first major step in the final liquidation steps by December 1, and to have the thing wound up to turn over to any centralized intelligence agency that might be formed by the Government (if one should be formed) by January 1.

"Naturally, we in communications will have the problem of dismantling our fixed installations, base stations and warehouses and the disposition of vast amounts of equipment all over the world; so it is quite likely that [REDACTED] and his Staff (supply) here will have to be kept on for a while. This is also true of the Message Center and Staff and will be true to a limited extent of our Adjutant's Office in order to process the men out when they return."

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D. CREATION OF STRATEGIC SERVICE UNIT (SSU)

On 27 September 1945, as an implementing vehicle for the tasks transferred to the Department of War from OSS, Secretary of War, Patterson, created the Strategic Services Unit. He appointed as Director of SSU, [REDACTED], USA, subject to the authority of and policies determined by the Assistant Secretary of War.

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In a memorandum for the Director of SSU, dated 26 September 1945, the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, set forth

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his general views on policies and procedures for SSU. He made SSU semi-autonomous stating that the Director would keep the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Chief of Staff advised of plans and activities. Only major questions of policy were required to be referred to the Assistant Secretary's Office.

25X1A [REDACTED] as Director of SSU, was charged with the continuing liquidation of those OSS activities and personnel transferred to the War Department which were no longer necessary or desirable, and the preservation as a unit of such of those functions and facilities as were valuable for permanent peacetime purposes, or which might be required by Theater Commanders or occupational authorities to assist in the discharge of their responsibilities.

25X1A [REDACTED] announced that

25X1A [REDACTED] has assumed command of the SSU. It is noted that a memorandum from [REDACTED] to the Secretary of War, dated 4 February 1946, was routed through

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25X1A [REDACTED], Interim Director, SSU." Thus,

25X1A it appears that [REDACTED] served as Director, SSU for a

25X1A period prior to [REDACTED] appointment. 4/

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E. SSU COMMUNICATIONS

1. Early Status

(a) Personnel

In a report of 9 October 1945, to the Assistant Secretary of War, the Director, SSU listed the status of SSU personnel as of the termination of OSS. 5/ Personnel of the Communications Branch totaled [REDACTED] on 30 September 1945, as follows:

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By memorandum addressed to [REDACTED] dated 25

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October 1945, [REDACTED] submitted an estimate of the personnel required to continue to operate SSU communications during liquidation of war-time services, and until final disposition (i. e., liquidation or absorption by a new agency), for the period 1 October 1945, to 31 December 1945. 6/ His estimated requirements were [REDACTED] personnel in the United States and [REDACTED] of the overseas requirement were for [REDACTED] personnel.

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In this same memorandum, [REDACTED] described the adverse personnel situation facing SSU at the time:

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"Attention is drawn to a most serious situation which has arisen in connection with the eligibility of key personnel for discharge under the point system. All but five of the officer personnel engaged in operation of this Branch are eligible for discharge at this time, and over 50 percent of the enlisted personnel will

successively become eligible for discharge during the next five weeks. In view of this situation, the Communications Branch, in the immediate future, will have considerable difficulty in performing its functions and by the latter part of November will cease to function altogether unless measures are taken without delay to employ civilian personnel. The most apparent solution would be to have discharged personnel waive terminal leave in favor of immediate employment as civilians on some temporary basis."

(b) General

A letter to All SSU Signal Officers dated 9 November

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1945, 7/ from [REDACTED] Executive Officer, Communications Branch made the following observations, which are indicative of the situation at that time:

"All of us in these positions realize that the war is over and are very anxious to clean up the affairs of the Branch. However, there are some commitments which must continue to be met and while every effort is constantly being made to return personnel to the States as fast as possible consistent with this program, certain traffic centers and radio circuits must be maintained for a while longer."

A progress report was submitted by the Chief, Communications Branch to the Director, SSU on 4 February 1946. 8/ Facts set forth therein provide a summary of communications efforts and problems in the first months of SSU operations:

(1) Liquidation

All SSU transmission facilities in Europe were disbanded prior to 1 November 1945, personnel redeployed, and equipment turned over to the U. S. Signal Corps. Consequently, all SSU traffic within Europe and between Europe and the United States and other theaters was shifted to the networks of the

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U. S. Army, to commercial networks, and facilities operated by other governments.

The SSU cryptographic systems were maintained so that with a few exceptions all SSU traffic continued to be handled in SSU ciphers.

In the Far East, all major SSU transmission installations were liquidated. A skeleton network was left operative through the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) [REDACTED] as no other transmission facilities for handling of such SSU traffic were available. In SEAC, net controls at [REDACTED] were taken over by the Signal Corps while the tributary stations were still being operated by SSU. SSU cryptographic systems remained unchanged regardless of carrier.

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25X1A In the Continental United States, even prior to 1 October 1945, the communications training and holding areas at [REDACTED] were abandoned, including all experimental radio installations both in [REDACTED]

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(2) Transition

A decision to continue a communications system to serve SSU necessitated the curtailment of liquidation measures in certain areas. Appropriate steps were taken to freeze personnel until replacements could be made available; and, in step with the general demobilization program, adequate civilian replacements were recruited.

It developed that the SSU skeleton radio systems left in the Far East were not only to be maintained but also were

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to be expanded. This made necessary the retention of some quantities of basic equipment for the support of such installations, as well as facilities to store, maintain, test, and ship such equipment. A readjustment in liquidation policy was required for the further reason that it became increasingly evident that the over-all and progressive deterioration of communications in Europe, as a result of drastic reductions in U. S. Signal Corps installations and personnel, would necessitate within the near future the re-establishment of SSU transmission facilities in certain areas on a small scale.

(3) Problems

The volume of traffic handled, both in the over-all SSU system and in the Washington Message Center, was continuing at an even level and had shown no decrease. A problem of the time was in the processing of traffic, particularly at Washington. This was caused by the fact that SSU traffic was handled by carriers whose facilities were handicapped by shortage of personnel and by the use of inexperienced replacements. As stated by the Chief, Communications Branch:

"The communications systems of the Federal Government carrying SSU traffic as a part of their over-all traffic have reverted to routine 'peacetime' operating principles, which principles are governed by economy in personnel and funds rather than by efficiency and security. Furthermore, in this post-hostilities phase, intelligence traffic as such is not recognized as having any precedence over any other traffic, and therefore is subject to the delays, insecurities, and general slowing down of official U. S. peacetime communications. The messages, while

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enciphered in SSU systems and processed by SSU Message Centers, are in the majority of instances extremely garbled by poor transmission and sloppy terminal handling, which results in substantial delays in the code rooms."

A serious handicap was a complete lack of any U. S. field installation for the purpose of testing both standard equipment and newly designed equipment. Previously available facilities had been closed out.

The obsolescence of much of the equipment left over from the period of hostilities necessitated, in the field of engineering and maintenance, concentrated effort to improve existing equipment and to develop new type clandestine facilities.


(c) World-wide Circuitry

Appendix A shows the world-wide SSU communications circuits as of 22 January 1946. SSU provided no transmission facilities in either Europe or Africa. In the Middle East, only the circuit between [REDACTED] was an SSU-operated radio circuit. Extensive SSU radio networks were in operation in [REDACTED] Southeast Asia.

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The over-all extent of SSU communications activity was indicated in a 26 February 1946, Communications chart. 9/ This



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In this early period, Washington Message Center traffic was peaking at over 20,000 coded groups per day. In January 1946,

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the high day was 26,500. The comparable peak day for all SSU Message Centers world-wide was 98,000 groups. 10/

(d) Coverage Plan

On 27 May 1946, the Communications Division, SSU submitted the following material to the Chief, Personnel Branch, 11/ in connection with an "Initial Outline Plan for World Coverage by SSU." This describes rather concisely the scope of communications planning at that time:

"The Communications Division will provide all types of communications for world-wide network coverage and emergency means in event of breakdown of normal channels, to include electrical, cryptographic, pouch, secret inks, and innocent text with particular stress being given to security of all communications facilities.

"Electrical means will include Army, Navy, and commercial carriers supplemented by agency links where required and by blind broadcast.

"Cryptographic facilities will be provided through close coordination with Army, Navy and State Department sections for all electrical means of transmission and for pouch or other facilities if required.

"Pouch facilities for the most part will entail use of existing State, War, and Navy facilities augmented where required by special couriers.

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In connection with the above, a schedule of personnel requirements for SSU as estimated to provide world coverage included the following figures for Communications:

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Continental U. S. A.	
Overseas	
Total	



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2. Organization

A provisional SSU organization chart was approved by the Director, SSU on 12 October 1945, [REDACTED].

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In this initial organization, the Communications Branch was under the Assistant Director for Intelligence. On 9 November 1945, [REDACTED], the Office of the Assistant Director for Intelligence was absorbed in the Director's Office, and the Office of the Deputy Director, SSU was established. Pending further reorganization, the Communications Branch reported to the Acting Deputy Director.

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[REDACTED] of 18 October 1945, announced the assignment of [REDACTED] as Chief of the Communications Branch, vice [REDACTED] relieved.

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[REDACTED] of 10 December 1945, presented a revised organization, superseding [REDACTED]. Under this new organization was an Operational Auxiliaries Branch, which was to provide operational services, including communications. The communications element then became the Communications Division, consisting of a Chief, a Security and Control Section, a Traffic Section, a Cipher Section, Supply Section, and a Research Section. At this time, [REDACTED] was designated Chief, Communications Division. Although official documentation cannot be quoted, it appears that from approximately 30 November 1945, to January 1946, the Chief of SSU Communications was [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This is based on a 30 November 1945, letter from the Communications Branch Executive

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Officer to all SSU Signal Officers, 12/ which states that

25X1A [REDACTED] had taken over the Branch from [REDACTED] 25X1A
 25X1A and that [REDACTED] was continuing in the capacity of Special
 25X1A Assistant to [REDACTED] Subsequently, by SSU Special
 25X1A [REDACTED] of 4 January 1946, [REDACTED] was named as 25X1A
 Chief, Operational Auxiliaries Branch. At that time, [REDACTED] 25X1A
 apparently reverted to Chief, Communications Division and con-
 tinued in that assignment until the spring of 1946, when relieved
 25X1A by [REDACTED] as announced in SSU [REDACTED] 25X1A
 of 10 May 1946.

25X1A A new SSU organization was announced on 17 June 1946, (SSU
 [REDACTED], superseding that proscribed on 10 December
 1945. The Communications Division remained under the Operational
 Auxiliaries Branch and now comprised a Division Chief and Operations,
 Security and Control, Research, Supply, and Message Center Sections,
 with responsibilities as follows:

- (1) The planning, organization, and operation of communications, insofar as they pertain to operational activities only.
- (2) The development and supply of operational communications equipment.
- (3) The security of all code and cipher messages.
- (4) Providing suitably trained code clerks and communications personnel for field stations of SSU.
- (5) Training of personnel in the techniques of operating and servicing communications equipment.

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(6) Operation of the Message Center including appropriate dissemination of all incoming and outgoing messages. (The dissemination function previously had been performed by the Cable Control Section of the SSU Secretariat.)

There were no significant changes in the SSU Communications set-up between the time of the 17 June reorganization and the final SSU termination order (SSU [REDACTED] of 19 October 1946.)

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3. Scope of Cable Service

SSU Staff Memorandum No. 18 of 8 January 1946, listed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] SSU overseas installations and provided abbreviations for each as cable designations. Later Staff Memoranda added [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] indicating by 13 May 1946, a world-wide total of [REDACTED] less Washington.

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A new system of address and cite indicators for use in SSU messages transmitted by cable to and from overseas points was introduced by SSU Staff Memorandum No. 65 of 27 June 1946. This Memorandum rescinded all earlier abbreviations and listed [REDACTED]

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4. Test Station, [REDACTED]

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Early in 1946, there was a need for a location remote from main laboratory facilities in Washington for the purpose of making "in service" tests of communications equipment designed for use by SSU. The object was to provide communications tests which offered experience closely paralleling actual operating conditions. An appropriate site was located near [REDACTED] on property of radio stations


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[REDACTED] Arrangements were made with the management of those stations to set up an SSU station.

The test station was established in April 1946, 13/in a small one-story building, located approximately 100 yards

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The station was operational until July 1947. The personnel and equipment were removed on 11 July 1947. 14/

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5. [REDACTED]

In early 1946, a considerable portion of the efforts of the Communications Division was being directed toward the betterment

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of SSU communications from a security standpoint. An important part of these efforts was action to offset the



6. SSU-Navy Liaison

In the transmission of intelligence to and from overseas installations, it was necessary for SSU to rely upon transmission facilities under the jurisdiction of other U. S. Government Departments or Agencies, upon commercial means where feasible, or upon its own facilities where others were not available or were inadequate. Up until April 1946, the facilities of the War Department alone were used, principally since SSU had been a War Department agency and since they were

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adequate to reach all major world areas concerned.

With a rapidly changing postwar communications picture, including the shrinkage of the Army overseas radio and relay networks, the non-use of Naval Communications was imposing definite limitations on the efficiency of SSU communications. In some areas where intelligence personnel were located, Naval communications alone were available. It was determined that arrangements should be made for the establishment of effective working liaison between the Chief of Naval Communications and the Director, SSU. On 17 May 1946, the Director, SSU, and a representative of the Chief, Communications Division, SSU, met with the Chief of Naval Communications, Rear Admiral Earl E. Stone, USN, to discuss such arrangements. 17/ Admiral Stone was receptive to the requirement and indicated that he would lend all possible assistance as specific SSU needs were presented. Appropriate Naval officers were indicated for further contact.

On 24 June 1946, the Director, SSU, levied the first requests on Naval Communications. 18/ First, sixty sets of two-way one-time pads of the type then being furnished by Navy to the State Department were desired. This was to facilitate the patterning of SSU traffic after that from the State Department installations where Navy-type pads were being used. Second, it was requested that SSU be provided with copies of Navy's current and future traffic routing diagrams, with the assurance that, in turn, SSU routing diagrams would be made available to Navy so that they

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could determine the desirability of using such facilities to points not covered by Naval communications. The establishment of technical liaison on common communications research problems was a third request. The Chief of Naval Communications approved these requests on 15 July 1946. 19/ This marked the beginning of close and cordial working relations between the communications organizations of Navy and SSU/CIG.

A requirement later levied on Navy involved the transmission over Navy facilities of traffic to and from SSU, Washington and SSU, [REDACTED] 20/ At that time, the use of SSU radio facilities by the Navy was offered for transmission of Navy traffic between

[REDACTED] and points covered by the SSU [REDACTED] radio network. However, Navy saw no requirement for use of SSU facilities except as a possible emergency measure. On 13 August 1946, the Chief of Naval Communications advised that arrangements had been made for handling SSU radio traffic between [REDACTED] and Washington, via Navy radio facilities, premised on the ability of the Navy to handle this traffic without increasing Navy facilities or personnel. 21/ The changeover from Army to Navy facilities for the handling of SSU traffic to and from [REDACTED] was effected on 27 August 1946.

7. SSU-ASA Liaison

The need for close liaison with the Army Security Agency (ASA) was recognized in the first days of SSU communications.

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While OSS had operated under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), most of the OSS functions remaining on 1 October 1945, had been placed under the jurisdiction of the War Department, with SSU as the operating Agency. This included communications; and in the first days of SSU, the requirement to readjust communications systems to conform with War Department procedures and practices, with particular reference to security aspects, became immediately apparent.

In a 31 October 1945, letter to the Chief, ASA, 22/ the Director, SSU stated that he had instructed his Communications Officer to review the procedures and practices of the SSU Signal System and to establish the necessary liaison with the ASA in order to insure that appropriate standards of security were maintained in all respects. He stated further that he would appreciate Chief, ASA making available to SSU the advice and help of ASA so that SSU communications facilities might have the benefit of complete liaison.

Chief, ASA, in reply, requested that specific problems facing SSU be indicated. On 7 November 1945, the Director, SSU provided such specifics, as follows: 23/

SSU communications systems must operate in accordance with established and accepted War Department standards of cryptographic and traffic security. Services desired from ASA were: (1) Make a formal inspection of the SSU Washington Signal Center and initiate a system of inspections at regular intervals; (2) Run checks on cryptographic materials produced by SSU for use between its Washington and field offices and consider the advisability of drawing such material from ASA; and (3) Inspect and check methods employed by SSU's Signal Security Control.

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The establishment of formal SSU-ASA liaison was reflected in correspondence of 26 January 1946, from the Director, SSU to the Commanding General, ASA. 24/ This correspondence stated that [REDACTED] recently relieved from active duty with ASA, had been appointed Special Assistant to the Chief, Communications Branch, SSU. Because of his experience in signal security, he was considered well suited to effect required liaison, previously conducted on an informal basis between SSU and ASA. It was further stated that [REDACTED] was hence-

forth to represent Communications Branch, SSU in all matters of common interest between the Branch and ASA.

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F. CREATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP (CIG) AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY (NIA)

CIG was created by Executive Directive of President Harry S. Truman on 22 January 1946. This Directive designated the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, together with another person to be named by the President as his personal representative, as the National Intelligence Authority (NIA) to plan, develop and coordinate all Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. Each Secretary was directed to assign persons and facilities from his respective Department, which persons were to collectively form a Central Intelligence Group and, under a Director of Central Intelligence, assist the NIA. The Directive further provided that:

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"The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the Heads (or their representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence agencies of the Government having functions related to national security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority."

NIA Directive No. 2, dated 8 February 1946, stated that the CIG "is hereby constituted and will be activated this date by the Director of Central Intelligence." The initial offices were designated as Director of Central Intelligence, Administrative Section, Central Reports Staff, Central Planning Staff, and Central Intelligence Services.

Admiral Sidney W. Souers was the first Director of Central Intelligence, serving until 10 June 1946, at which time Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg was named to the post. The personal representative of the President in the NIA was Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy.

An important step in the transition from SSU to CIG concerned the control of liaison with Government agencies. In a memorandum dated 26 July 1946, to the Director, SSU, Colonel Donald H. Galloway, USA, Assistant Director for Special Operations, signing "For the Director, CIG," issued the following directive:

"Effective this date, all operational matters involving SSU and Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government will be handled by the Control Office, Special Operations, CIG.

"All administrative matters involving SSU and Departments and Agencies of the U. S. Government will be handled through appropriate personnel in the Executive Office, Special Operations of the Executive Officer of CIG.

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"Those offices and individuals of SSU that are now conducting liaison with Departments on operational and administrative matters will terminate such contact without delay."

Pursuant to Presidential Directive, on 1 May 1947, Lt.

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg was relieved as Director of Central Intelligence by Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, USN.

G. SSU/CIG COMMUNICATIONS

1. Latin American Radio Network

At the time SSU came into being, the FBI, in connection with its Latin American activities dating from the early 1940's, was operating a network of manual CW radio circuits in Central and South America. Radio stations were in operation at [REDACTED] locations throughout that region, with a control station in Washington, D. C.

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In 1946, CIG was directed by NIA to assume by 30 June 1947, the intelligence coverage in Latin America that was then performed by the FBI. Involved in this action was the takeover by SSU communications of the radio network. Negotiations for the transfer commenced in July 1946. Under agreements reached, all equipment in the radio stations was turned over to SSU. In lieu of financial reimbursement, SSU replaced in kind the major items of equipment received, based on existing inventories prepared by FBI.

There were three principal factors requiring resolution in the plans for network takeover: (1) personnel recruitment; (2) procurement of radio frequencies; and (3) establishment of a radio base station in the United States.

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Personnel: Recruitment proceeded very slowly for the following reasons. 25/ There was difficulty in interesting skilled technicians at the salaries established. Selection standards were high in an attempt to maintain sufficiently higher personal standards to insure proper meshing with

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staff necessitated postponement of even preliminary interviews for a considerable period of weeks. Long periods of time were expended in correspondence, processing of forms, and particularly in security investigations and clearances.

Radio Frequencies: An initial problem in the transfer of the network concerned the procurement of radio operating frequencies for SSU stations. Frequency allocations to Government agencies were controlled by the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) composed of about twelve members from various Government organizations. Official clearance by this body was necessary before SSU (CIG) could use any frequencies. However, the over-all frequency situation was such that allocation of frequencies to CIG would require withdrawal from some other user. In the face of this situation, it was determined which frequencies the FBI was using for the network; and on 18 December 1946, the Director of Central Intelligence addressed a letter to the Director, FBI (J. Edgar Hoover) requesting that he indicate his willingness to release the frequencies so that CIG could make

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formal application to IRAC for reassignment to CIG. On 3 January 1947, Mr. Hoover agreed to the release of several frequencies, subject to the shared use by CIG and FBI until CIG has assumed complete operation of the network. Based on FBI's agreement, a formal request to IRAC followed; and in its meeting of 6 February 1947, IRAC approved the allocation to CIG of the former FBI frequencies. 26/

U. S. Base Station: The FBI radio base station in the United States was not made available to SSU in the transfer. It became necessary, therefore, to arrange for other facilities. The possible use of Army Signal Corps facilities to provide a U. S. terminal for the Central and South American stations was first explored, and it was determined that satisfactory arrangements could not be made. The problem was next presented to Naval Communications. As a result, by early November 1946, an

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The orderly transfer of responsibility for Latin American intelligence operations from the FBI to CIG was complicated by persistent attempts of the Director, FBI to withdraw his personnel from the area before CIG was prepared to take over.

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Although CIG desired to take over at the earliest possible date, that agency repeatedly emphasized that a reasonable time was required to recruit, train, and introduce competent personnel and proper facilities, and that, to avoid lapses in operations and to insure continuity of intelligence production, withdrawal of FBI personnel should not take place without consultation and agreement by CIG. The Director, FBI on the other hand felt that if the FBI were to get out of Latin America, it should get out as quickly as possible. Consequently, he announced the closure of certain offices without prior assurance that CIG was able to meet the projected FBI withdrawal dates. A long series of correspondence exchanges between FBI and CIG and many conferences between representatives of the two agencies took place during the period July-September 1946. At the height of the difficulties, the NIA on 8 August 1946, addressed a letter to the Attorney General of the United States, reporting on the situation and requesting that the Director, FBI be instructed to retain his personnel in the Latin American countries until the CIG was able to assume responsibility. 27/

In December 1946, an accelerated schedule was established for entry of CIG into Latin America. CIG offices in [REDACTED] locations were included, with radio stations planned in [REDACTED]. The Communications Division was working toward activation of radio stations as CIG offices opened. [REDACTED] already was open, [REDACTED]

25X1A [REDACTED] was scheduled for 20 January 1947, and other offices were

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In the interests of security, CIG imitated so far as possible the radio procedure previously used in the FBI network. FBI frequencies which could be made legal for use in the United States were retained by the base station, while in South America such frequencies were retained as had not been rendered useless by spectrum and propagation changes. The exact call letters used by the FBI throughout Latin America also were retained. Although the Washington base station could not legally use FBI's call signs, regularly assigned U. S. Government call letters were used.

By September 1947, the network had been operating under CIG for several months, and the use of Navy facilities operated by CIG personnel had not proven entirely satisfactory. Consequently, efforts had been underway for some time to locate sites for independent CIG radio receiving and transmitting stations to replace the [REDACTED] arrangement. 30/ A suitable receiver station location was found at

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25X1A [REDACTED] on a site formerly used as a Navy radio station. 31/ A transmitter site was located in a radio station area formerly used by the [REDACTED]

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25X1A [REDACTED] 32/ Authority for the use of these sites was obtained, approval was received to establish the radio stations, and plans went forward accordingly. The factors bearing most directly on the decision to establish self-contained CIG facilities were improved security, control,

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[REDACTED] CIG/SSU official communications could be handled thereby with desired efficiency, with marked economy compared with normal commercial cable costs, and especially with greater security against interruption of service during crises.

The network replaced for the Middle East area the carrier facilities only (or part of them) which had been furnished during World War II by the communications contingent of overseas missions and during the peace in occupied areas. It did not replace other services, chiefly of a covert nature, which continued to be furnished by the Communications Division independent of the Middle East net project.

From the standpoint of CIG operations people, a major value of the network was considered its availability in case of emergencies in the critical Middle East area. The technical plans for the net, therefore, gave heavy cognizance to provision of facilities which would provide uninterrupted communications in emergencies where other communications channels were unavailable to U. S. officials in the area.

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This set was for emergency use only and remained in a sealed pouch stored in a locked cabinet. In August, a small radio station was set up at [REDACTED] also for emergency use only, to be operated by [REDACTED] in case of disruption of normal communications service. 43/

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By memorandum dated 11 July 1947, to the Chief, Communications Division, the Assistant Director for Special Operations set forth as follows revised procedures for the operation of communications projects in the Middle East:

"The Communications Project in the Near East was established in advance of most OSO stations in that area at the request of one of the member agencies under NIA.

"With the establishment of stations throughout the Middle East for CIG operations, it is deemed advisable to bring communications personnel and equipment under the respective Station Chiefs for security, administrative and operational direction.

"In accordance with the above, the former communications projects will no longer operate as independent units, but will be integrated with the Foreign Branch operations, subject to control of the respective Station Chiefs."

A major hurdle in development of the Middle East Network was the difficulty encountered in personnel recruitment. In connection with this problem, the Acting Chief, Operations Section, Communications Division [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] made these comments on 1 July 1947: 44/ "None of our overseas organizational charts is completely filled, and the Middle East chart is very short of its required strength. As

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the Middle East posts are extremely difficult for American personnel, both physically and mentally, replacements will be necessary in the near future." Factors contributing to the recruiting difficulties of the time were: (1) Radio personnel in the United States were more settled than they had been a year previously; many now had satisfactory jobs, and become more soundly readjusted after the long years away at war, and, as a result, were no longer as receptive to an overseas job offer. (2) Several commercial companies had been draining the pool of personnel willing to go overseas with some very good job offers.

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radio equipment particularly adapted for clandestine intelligence operations to obtain information as to the ultimate capabilities of such equipment. Satisfactory completion of the experiments required extensive transoceanic tests. It was proposed to establish an overseas SSU experimental base station for this purpose. The initial intention was to place this station [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

went ahead. 57/ However, unforeseen changes in the military establishment in the Mediterranean Theater necessitated a change in plans.

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[REDACTED] Communications Officer for SSU, Europe, arrived at his Headquarters in [REDACTED] on 11 July

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1946. He was appointed to serve as technical consultant on communications matters for all missions and stations in Europe. 58/ One of his first projects was to prepare a staff study for presentation to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Forces European Theater (USFET), covering establishment of a station in the [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] for SSU communications experiments. This was the base originally planned for [REDACTED] Concurrence was received from the Commanding General, USFET, on 20 August. 59/ A survey of possible sites for the installation of the base radio station followed.

A radio officer and four radio operators reached [REDACTED] during August to implement the project. Additional personnel and

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for personnel from the foreign operational branches of SSU. 63/
This training expanded and carried over into CIG. By the time CIG became CIA, a comprehensive curriculum was being given under the Cryptographic Training Unit of the Signal Security Section, Communications Division. The course included instruction in both off-line and on-line systems, routing of messages, headings, prosigns and procedures, external message set-up, security precautions, teletype equipment, and, as time permitted, tape reading. The student became familiar with pertinent instructional documents and sent and received messages, some with garbles, some without. At about the time CIA was formed, plans were being made to provide the student greater participation in Headquarters Signal Center activities, especially machine operation. Facilities for typing instruction were maintained; but in the six weeks' course, time for achieving real typing skill was limited.

(b) Radio

With the closing of the OSS training activities at

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no formal facilities for training radio operators. Training provided during the SSU/CIG years was conducted in various locations in the Washington, D. C., area wherever classroom space could be found.

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and Briefing. 68/ The essential points were as follows:

Semi-Covert Personnel: The Communications Division was to be consulted when the operational plan for each semi-covert operation was being prepared. If communications training was required, requests were to be routed through the Chief, Training Branch to the Communications Division, and these two offices would work out the training schedule. If any briefing in communications was required, the Communications Division was to notify the Foreign Branch and arrange for this.

Deep-Cover Personnel: The Communications Division was to be consulted early in the planning stage for each deep-cover operation. If communications training was required, the time schedule and meeting places were to be arranged by the Training Branch in consultation with Communications. Arrangements for any final briefings upon completion of the training period were to be arranged directly with the Communications Division.

7. Security

A major step in improved cryptographic control within SSU was taken in Staff Memorandum No. 49 of 17 May 1946. This directive provided that the Cipher Distribution Office, Signal Security and Control Section, Communications Division, would assume accountability for all cryptographic documents and equipment purchased or constructed by the Strategic Services Unit. This procedure was adopted to afford the highest degree of security for all cryptographic documents and devices controlled by the SSU.

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With the advent of CIG, this action was reaffirmed and strengthened in CIG Administrative Order No. 49 of 26 December 1946, Subject: Responsibility for Communications Documents Equipment, etc." This Order provided the following:

- (1) The Communications Division, Personnel and Administrative Branch assumed accountability for all cryptographic documents and equipment procured, used, or constructed by CIG
- (2) The Communications Division was the Office of Records for all cryptographic documents and devices issued to CIG by other Governmental agencies or departments. No cipher material, equipment, or methods were to be employed by any CIG activity except those which had been authorized and issued by the Communications Division.
- (3) All activities of CIG requiring any type of communications equipment or facilities were to obtain the prior approval or authorization of the Chief, Communications Division or his authorized representative, prior to the initiating of a request to any Governmental department or agency or private concern in order to fulfill the requirement.

8. Clandestine Operations

(a) General

In discussing "Assets of SSU for Peacetime Intelligence Procurement" in a memorandum dated 15 January 1946, to Major

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H. LIQUIDATION AND TERMINATION OF SSU

1. Liquidation

NIA Directive No. 4 dated 2 April 1946, set forth policies and procedures relating to the liquidation of the SSU:

"The national interest demands that the complete liquidation of SSU shall not be accomplished until it is determined which of its functions and activities are required for the permanent Federal foreign intelligence program, and should therefore be transferred to the Central Intelligence Group or other agencies in order that its useful assets may not be lost. Such determination and transfer shall be made and the liquidation of the remainder of SSU shall be completed as promptly as possible and prior to 1 July 1947."

On 6 April 1946, the Acting Secretary of War (Howard G. Petersen) issued the following directive to the Director of the SSU:

"Effective immediately, you are directed to continue the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) as ordered in paragraph 3 of the Executive Order dated 20 September 1945, subject: Termination of the Office of Strategic Services and Disposition of its Functions. The liquidation will be completed not later than 30 June 1947."

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2. Termination Order

All SSU operations were officially terminated by

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SSU [REDACTED], which reads as follows:

"1. Effective 2400, 19 October 1946, all operations of the SSU are terminated.

"2. Administrative activities incident to disposition of personnel, materiel, records, claims, settlements, etc., will be continued until final and complete liquidation of the SSU is effected at a later date."

On 1 November 1946, the Director of Central Intelligence asked that the remaining property, supplies and equipment of SSU be transferred to CIG, and SSU agreed.

3. Arrangements for Handling Residual Affairs

By memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War, 11 April 1947, the Director, SSU [REDACTED] reported on the status of SSU liquidation and requested to be relieved as Director. He also indicated that some provision for the handling of the residual affairs of OSS-SSU was necessary. This memorandum stated, in part:

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"All civilian personnel of SSU have been terminated and military personnel have been transferred or reassigned. Foreign missions and stations were liquidated as SSU installations on or before 20 October 1946.... Experience indicates that claims and inquiries arising out of past operations of OSS-SSU will continue, and no accurate estimate can be now made of their number or when they will come."

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[REDACTED] was relieved as Director, SSU as of 16 April 1947. On the same date, the Assistant Secretary of War designated Colonel Donald H. Galloway as Director, SSU, "until final liquidation of said unit, unless earlier relieved. This

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is in addition to your other duties with the Central Intelligence Group." Colonel Galloway was at that time Assistant Director for Special Operations, CIG.


4. Communications

All communications functions and activities remaining at the 19 October 1946, termination of SSU were transferred to or absorbed by CIG. Selected personnel, as well as circuitry, equipment and such installations as were destined to be continued, were included in this transfer; and the change for the most part was in name only.

Preparations for assumption of responsibilities by CIG had been underway for some time prior to 19 October. For example, the Communications Division monthly report for September 1946, states: 76/

"Activities during the month were largely concerned with the liquidation of present SSU commitments and the arrangements for a transfer of functions to the equivalent unit within the Central Intelligence Group. Consistent with the imminent change, liaison channels are being established with all major CIG components."

As of 30 September 1946, in the final days of SSU operation, communications personnel totals were as follows: 76/

	Continental U. S. A.	
	Pending Shipment Overseas	
	Europe	
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	Total	

25X9

In September 1946, traffic volumes had dropped materially from the early SSU days. For example, the Washington Message

Center was handling about 9,700 groups per day as compared with over 20,000 in January. 77/

I. CIG COMMUNICATIONS

1. Organization

CIG Personnel Order No. 14 of 11 September 1946, announced the appointment of [REDACTED] as Chief, Communications Division. As assimilation of selected SSU personnel continued, many SSU communications personnel received official appointment to CIG. By late October 1946, the former SSU Communications Division Chief, [REDACTED] had assumed duties as Deputy Chief, Communications Division, CIG.

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Pursuant to CIG [REDACTED] (Reorganization of CIG), CIG Administrative Order No. 6 of 22 July 1946, defined the organization and functions of the Executive Office. The Personnel and Administrative Branch, under the Executive for Personnel and Administration, included a Communications Division, with responsibilities as follows:

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1. Provides all communications service for CIG.
2. Operates a message center.
3. Operates a mail room.
4. Maintains central records and files.
5. Provides cable service.
6. Provides courier service on a world-wide basis.

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7. Conducts necessary specialized research to provide safe, efficient communications for operating offices.

Based on agreements reached between representatives of the Executive Officer for Personnel and Administration and of the Assistant Director for Special Operations at a conference on 21 January 1947, a new modus operandi was adopted for the Communications Division. 78/ The basic factors governing the new system of operation were as follows:

1. Specific personnel comprised the Communications Section, Projects Support Division (PSD), Office of Special Operations (OSO), while others comprised the Communications Division, Personnel and Administration Branch (P&A). 79/

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2. The Chief, Communications Division, P&A (Colonel [REDACTED]) exercised over-all control of all communications within CIG, including those of OSO.

3. The Chief, Communications Section, PSD [REDACTED] also served as Deputy Chief, Communications Division, P&A.

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4. Communications Section, PSD, was responsible primarily for the communications requirements of OSO, but it could undertake specific duties for other branches and offices of CIG.

5. The Communications Division, P&A, was responsible for the communications requirements of CIG except OSO.

6. The split between P&A and PSD was for intra-agency purposes only. For presentation to the Civil Service Commission and other extra-agency purposes, there was only

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one Communications Division, CIG, under P&A.

The over-all Communications Division was described on 27 February 1947, in a statement of functions prepared by the Chief, Communications Division, as follows: 80/

"The Communications Division, P&A Branch, consists of eight sections whose duties are briefly outlined below:

"1. The Office of the Chief: Responsibility for the over-all operational and administrative control of the Communications Division rests with this Office. High-level liaison with Communications activities in Government and commercial agencies is maintained by specially-designated personnel through the Office of the Chief. The Central Files for the Division, and all personnel and administrative records are the responsibility of clerical assistants. Administrative assistants coordinate the recruiting of personnel and their processing for domestic and/or overseas assignment.

"2. The Signal Center: All CIG traffic is encoded and decoded in the Signal Center which also has facilities for the transmission of traffic to Government and commercial carriers. Incoming and outgoing traffic is processed for distribution within the agency. Units of the Signal Center include: Cipher Unit, Processing Unit, Means Unit and the Traffic Control Unit.

"3. The Signal Security Section: Four main units comprise the Signal Security Section.

a. Cryptographic accountability and distribution unit.

b. Statistical records (including traffic figures, cable costs records).

c. Cryptographic Training Unit.

d. Physical and cryptographic security unit.

"4. Central Records: Central Records is responsible for the CIG mail room, for all courier service within and outside the agency, for the maintenance of Central Files

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for CIG, for the registering and routing of all CIG mail and pouch material.

"5. The Research and Engineering Section: Communications equipment is developed, maintained, tested, inspected and engineered in fully-equipped laboratories.

"6. The Operations Section: This Section is responsible for the planning of communications operations overseas, for the assembly of technical data relating to overseas installations and for the maintenance of up-to-date information on world-wide communications facilities. A radio training program is also included in the activities of the Operations Section.

25X1A "7. The Signal Property Control Section: All communications equipment is stored, packed and distributed from the Communications Warehouse [REDACTED]. The Section is also responsible for the proper accounting and control of all communications equipment in all installations, both domestic and overseas.

"8. Telephone Switchboard: Complete telephone service for all CIG office and staff echelons is furnished by the Communications Division."

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CIG [REDACTED], announced changes in the CIG organization and functions, effective 1 July 1947. The functions of the Communications Division, Personnel and Administrative Branch, were transferred to the Office of Special Operations, except telephone, central records, and courier service. It was stated that "OSO will provide adequate communications security and support of all of CIG." This spelled the end of the split operation (P&A and PSD) and centralized the Communications Division in OSO.

Although the Communications Division was responsible not only for servicing the requirements of OSO, but also for providing complete communications support to all other components of CIG, it

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3. Liaison with Department of State

Official liaison between CIG and the Department of State on cryptographic matters was formally established in September 1946, with specific individuals in the Department designated to deal with CIG Communications on mutual problems. 85/

J. CREATION OF CIA

The National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 495), approved 26 July 1947, provided for the establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the new National Security Council, in the Executive Office of the President. The National Intelligence Authority and its Central Intelligence Group ceased to exist; and

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the personnel, property, and records of the latter were transferred to the CIA.

The Central Intelligence Agency was officially activated as of 18 September 1947. CIG issuances, as appropriate, were renumbered into a CIA system of issuances and were amended in conformance with the organization and statements of functions as set forth in Official CIG Organization Charts dated 1 July 1947.

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CIA [REDACTED] reads, "Effective 26 September 1947, the Central Intelligence Group is established as the Central Intelligence Agency...."

From the standpoint of Communications, much of the transition from OSS to CIA had consisted of organization changes only, for communications facilities and operations were continuing requirements, whether functioning under the aegis of OSS, SSU, or CIG.

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